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TOM JONES vs. THE UNITED STATES
Uncle Sam's reply, by PHILIP HORNBEIN, of the Denver Bar

MEMORANDUM
T WILL be conceded that the National Industrial Recovery Act confers powers upon the President and imposes
restrictions upon business that are altogether new in
Americarn legislation. But it must be remembered that this
Act was passed in pursuance of the promise of a "new deal"
by President Roosevelt. The fact that a law establishes a new
rule of conduct is not sufficient to make it unconstitutional,
for every law is to some extent an innovation. Progress necessarily means change. There can be no change unless the old
is superseded by the new. -Nor does the fact that the fundamental policy of the N. I. R. A. is a radical departure from
previous policies and traditions make the law unconstitutional.
Jones was convicted in that he discharged one of his
employees for refusing to join a shop association and because
he, on divers occasions, sold Best-Fit shirts at less than cost
for the purpose of attracting trade, all in violation of the Code
of fair competition promulgated pursuant to the National
Industrial Recovery Act. The fine imposed at first blush seems
excessive. Under the provisions of a law sponsored by a distinguished namesake of the present appellant, the punishment
would be much more severe, for under the drastic terms of
the Jones law many violators were sent to the penitentiary
for selling and manufacturing a pint of whiskey. Yet the
Jones law was only a noble experiment. We are not making
comparisons, but it should be noted that the N. I. R. A. exemplifies an ideal long cherished in the human breast-the
ideal of economic justice. What better expression of that
ideal than the memorable words but recently uttered by our
great President: "As between profits first and humanity
afterwards, and humanity first and profits afterwards, we
shall not hesitate."
But it is said that this goal towards which mankind
has been striving is not within the possibilities of practical
attainment. It is argued that our fundamental law forbids.
174
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To the man who is not trained in legalistic lore this argument, on the face of it at least, would seem absurd. For was
not the Constitution itself ordained and established to form
a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves
and our posterity? The establishment of social and economic
justice, therefore, is within not only the spirit but the very
letter of the Constitution. Who will say that profits are not
to be postponed to human rights? To paraphrase a famous
dictum-'"Profits were made for man, and not man for profits." The immediate objective of the N. I. R. A. is to secure
a living wage to men and women employed in industry, and
to so direct industry that men and women willing to work
will have that opportunity. That a man should have an
opportunity to work, and that he should obtain a living
wage if he diligently performs his work, is a proposition
upon which all will agree. Even those who deny the power
of the Government to exert its powers toward that end are
forced to admit that the right of man to a living wage rests
upon ethical principles that are unassailable.
So it may safely be asserted that the objective sought to
be attained by the National Industrial Recovery Act is at
least within the broad general principles of the Federal Constitution. The question then narrows itself into this:
whether the means designed to accomplish this concedably
beneficent objective are obnoxious to the Constitution.
Of course, the appellant cannot point to any specific
provision in the Constitution which guarantees to him the
right to condition the continuance of his employees' employment upon their becoming members of his shop organization.
Nor can he show any specific grant which gives him the right
to sell his merchandise at low cost. This is mentioned because we shall presently refer to the recent decision of the
Supreme Court sustaining the constitutionality of the Minnesota Moratorium Act, where it was held that the specific
inhibition against the impairment of the obligations of contract was properly suspended, on account of the present emergency. But it is still open to appellant to show, if he can,
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that the Fifth Amendment has been violated. This Amendment, as we all know, guarantees due process as against the
Federal Government. Its counterpart, the Fourteenth
Amendment, guarantees due process as against the State Government. Due process of law, as we conceive it, was never
designed to obstruct the advance of social justice. The conception goes back to the days of King John and Magna
Charta. It was for protection against arbitrary edicts of the
King that the Barons forced King John to yield the Great
Charter at Runnymede. It is a singular thing that up to the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment the Constitutional
guarantee of due process was seldom invoked as against the
Federal Government. This is pointed out by Mr. Justice
Miller in the case of Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S., Vol.
6 (pages 103-104).
"It is not a little remarkable, that while this provision
has been in the Constitution of the United States, as a restraint upon the authority of the Federal government, for
nearly a century, and while, during all that time, the manner
in which the powers of that government have been exercised
has been watched with jealousy, and subjected to the most
rigid criticism in all its branches, this special limitation upon
its powers has rarely been invoked in the judicial forum of
the more enlarged theatre of public discussion. But while it
has been a part of the Constitution, as a restraint upon the
power of the States, only a very few years, the docket of this
court is crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold
that State courts and State legislatures have deprived their
own citizens of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law."
Since that decision hundreds of cases have been taken to
the Supreme Court of the United States for the purpose of
annulling State legislation enacted, ostensibly at least, in the
exercise of police power. Practically every measure designed
to promote social justice has been subjected to the test of due
process of law. It is in the light of these decisions that the
present question must be considered.
It will not be disputed, of course, that the trend of judicial decisions has been against governmental interference with
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private business, unless the operation of such private business
has some direct relation to the public morality, health or
safety. This tendency was exceptionally pronounced in the
few cases where there was an attempt made to regulate prices.
It was always conceded that a business which Was quasi public was subjected to governmental regulation in the matter
of price or charge. The distinction was clearly drawn between a business strictly private and one public or quasi
public, because in the latter case the business or calling could
not be carried on without the authorization of the Government. Therefore, it was very logically and properly concluded that such business was subject to governmental regulation. Nevertheless, the right of the State to control and
regulate the price charged by a private business, under certain
exceptional circumstances, was sustained by the Supreme
Court of the United States. The case of Munn v. Illinois,
94 U. S. 113, provoked as much comment and discussion as
the present case involving the constitutionality of the N. I.
R. A. The agrarian population were in revolt against what
they thought were extortionate charges exacted by grain elevators. The State of Illinois passed a law fixing the maximum charge of storage and handling of grain. The warehouses challenged the constitutionality of this price-fixing
statute, on the ground that it was offensive to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Chief Justice Waite went back to the writings
of Lord Chief Justice Hale to show that it is lawful to regulate charges in certain callings. He concluded that the grain
elevator business was affected with a public interest. It is
interesting to note that this forward-looking Chief Justice
used the term "social science" way back in 1876. Let me
quote this prophetic excerpt from his decision (page 133):
"It presents, therefore, a case for the application of a
long-known and well-established principle in social science,
and this statute simply extends the law so as to meet this new
development of commercial progress."
Justice Field wrote a strong dissenting opinion, in
which he declared that "the principle upon which the opinion
of the majority proceeds is, in my judgment, subversive of
the rights of private property, heretofore believed to be pro-
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tected by constitutional guaranties against legislative interference, and is in conflict with the authorities cited in its
support."
An interesting discussion of the repercussions of this
decision is found in Warren's History of the Supreme Court
of the United States. It was bitterly assailed by the conservative press of the East, and enthusiastically applauded by the
papers in the agricultural section. The decision caused great
alarm and misgivings in business circles, and the prophets of
gloom predicted that the Government could not endure. The
principle in Munn vs. Illinois has never been overruled. It
must be admitted that its application has not been extended.
It is more probable that it has been restricted. The Supreme
Court of the United States refused to apply this principle in
the case of the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations Act
(Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
43 Sup. Ct. 630. The opinion in that case was written by
Chief Justice Taft. In the course of it the Chief Justice declared:
"It has never been supposed, since the adoption of the
Constitution, that the business of the butcher, or the baker,
the tailor, the woodchopper, the mining operator, or the
miner was clothed with such a public interest that the price
of his product or his wages could be fixed by state regulation."
The question of the right to establish a minimum wage
was squarely before the Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 43 Sup. Ct. 394. While the law was sought to be supported upon the theory that women were the object of special
solicitude, yet both the majority opinion, written by Judge
Sutherland, and the minority opinion of Judge Holmes, ignore any differentiation between men and women in reference
to the right of the Government to fix a minimum wage.
Judge Sutherland, in the majority opinion, maintains that on
account of the political and economic emancipation of
women, their legal status was the same as men. Judge
Holmes observed that, "It will need more than the Nineteenth Amendment to convince me that there are no differences between men and women, or that legislation cannot
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take those differences into account." However, Judge Holmes'
dissent was put on the ground that it was within the inherent
power of Congress to remove conditions leading to ill health,
the
immorality and the deterioration of the race, and that if,
belief could be reasonably entertained that a minimum wage
would tend to create such a result, the law fixing such wage
could be constitutional. So the decision in this minimum
wage case is an authority against the Government in the present matter.
Notwithstanding that the trend of judicial authority
has been against the constitutionality of laws which undertake to control wages or prices, we still submit that the validity of the present Act rests upon impregnable grounds of
constitutional interpretation.
Chief Justice Hughes, in Home Building &' Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 54 Sup. Court Reporter, 231-242, reiterated the memorable warning of Chief Justice Marshall that
"We must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding * * * a constitution intended to endure for ages

to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs."
Attorney General Cummings, in an address before the
American Bar Association, emphasized the point that a Constitution in its nature is dynamic and not static. He referred
to Woodrow Wilson, who expressed this thought-that a
Constitution is the life of a nation, and not a lawyer's document. The New Deal is out of line with ancient economic
theories and traditions. But theories, however ancient, must
yield to stubborn facts. It is a condition, and not a theory,
that confronts us, and, as Attorney General Cummings puts
it, "The Constitution must be interpreted in the light of economic realism, and not narrow legalism."
No one would seriously contend that constitutional law
is an exact science. If it is a science at all, it is progressive.
The true function of the constitutional jurist is to find
4ground for a rational compromise between individual rights
and public welfare." Let me quote the gist of the decision of
Chief Justice Hughes in the Minnesota mortgage case (pp.
241-242):
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"It is manifest from this review of our decisions that
there has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of
the ,necessity of finding ground for a rationalcompromise between individual rights and public welfare. The settlement
and consequent contraction of the public domain, the pressure
of a constantly increasing density of population, the interrelation of the activities of our people, and the complexity of
our economic interests, have inevitably led to an increased use
of the organization of society in order to protect the very
basis of individual opportunity. Where, in earlier days, it
was thought that only the concerns of individuals or of
classes were involved, and that those of the state itself were
touched only remotely, it has later been found that the fundamental interests of the state are directly affected; and that
the question is no longer merely that of one party to a contract as against another, but of the use of reasonable means to
safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of all
depends.
"It is no answer to say that this public need was not
apprehended a century ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it
must mean to the vision of our time. If by the statement that
what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it
means today, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the
Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which
the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time,
would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own
refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception
that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning:
'We must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding' (McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407, 4
L. Ed. 579); 'a constitution intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs.' "
This pronouncement is destined to enjoy judicial immortality. It is an authoritative, judicial expression of the
essence of the New Deal.
The exact limits of due process of law have never been
exactly circumscribed. Upon numerous occasions the Su-
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preme Court, has declined to prescribe a specific formula
which must always be adhered to. On the contrary, it has
left the ascertainment of due process, like its counterpart, the
police power, to the judicial process of exclusion and inclusion.
Speaking of the constitutional prohibition against the
impairment of the obligation of contracts, Chief Justice
Hughes, in the case already referred to, said:
"The prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to
be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula."
This observation is even more true in respect to due process
of law. It has long been acknowledged by all political scientists and jurists that a State may actually destroy private
property under certain extreme conditions. This may be done
and always could be done to prevent the spread of fire or the
ravages of pestilence. This acknowledged right has sprung
from the overwhelming law of necessity and from the inherent right of the State to preserve itself. We fail to discern any
essential difference between the power of the State to prevent
physical destruction, and its power to prevent economic and
social destruction. If the State has the constitutional potency
to challenge and conquer, if it can, the hostile forces of nature,
why is it not equally potent to overcome social maladjustments that are man-made? Undoubtedly this situation entered into the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Minnesota case, because that Court quotes with approval a portion
of the opinion of Justice Olsen of the State Court of Minnesota, in the course of which that judge said (p. 234) :
"The present nation wide and world wide business and
financial crisis has the same results as if it were caused by
flood, earthquake, or disturbance in nature."
But it will be said that this is merely an emergency; that
an emergency does not create power; that constitutional
guarantees are meaningless and illusory if they function only
in normal times; that their very purpose is to withstand the
stress and strain of abnormal and extraordinary times. But
the effective and conclusive answer to this contention is expressed by Chief Justice Hughes (p. 235):
"While emergency does not create power, emergency
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may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power. Although
an emergency may not call into life a power which has never
lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the
exertion of a living power already enjoyed. * * * Thus, the

war power of the federal. government is not created by the
emergency of war, but it is a power given to meet that emergency. It is a power to wage war successfully, and thus it
permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a
supreme co-operative effort to preserve the nation."
"But even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties." Apparently it was concluded by the Supreme Court that the right
of a mortgagee to foreclose and take possession of mortgaged
property according to the letter of his contract was not one
of the essential liberties of the citizen, for it was held that this
strict contractual right must yield to the greater public right
and to the common welfare. Up to the time of this decision
there was nothing more sacred in business life than a mortgage. The very term denoted something held with a deathlike grip. If it be not one of the essential liberties or rights of
the citizens to have immediate foreclosure of his mortgage,
how can it be said that it is his essential right or liberty to
engage in industry for profit and to deny to his employees a
living wage? A man's right to live carries with it the necessarily incidental right to obtain such material rewards and
profits as will make that life full, enjoyable and happy. But
this inherent natural and constitutional right is subject to the
necessary limitation that the other fellow also live. "Live
and let live" is a doctrine that has always been accepted as
sound in morality and in ethics. It is the purpose of the New
Deal to give vitality to that doctrine in law and under the
Constitution.
But let us return to the decisions. We feel that we can
construct from their reasoning a sufficient constitutional
foundation for the N. I. R. A. Ever since the commencement
of the present century it has been judicially recognized that it
was within the law-making power to limit the hours of employment in certain industries. Formerly it was the prevailing juristic thought that the Legislature could not fix the
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hours of employment because a man's health and his right to
reasonable longevity was a matter of his own private ccincern,
and it was meddlesome on the part of the State to interfere.
But that doctrine was repudiated by the Supreme Court in
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, wherein the constitutionality of the Utah eight-hour law was sustained. Answering
the generally accepted position of that time, the Supreme
Court said (p. 397):
"The State still retains an interest in his welfare, however reckless he may be. The whole is no greater than the
sum of all the parts, and when the individual health, safety
and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the State must suffer."
There was a brief recrudescence of the discredited doctrine
that the State is powerless in the matter of hours of employment, in the case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45. In
that case the Court held a ten-day law for bakers unconstitutional. It will be remembered that it was that decision and a
decision of the New York Court of Appeals, which held a
Workmen's Compensation Act as unconstitutional because it
was socialistic, that provoked the wrath of the first Roosevelt. It was those decisions that impelled his famous pronouncement for the recall of judicial decisions that held unconstitutional social legislation.
So then, even in the light of the most conservative interpretation of the Constitution, it is perfectly proper to limit
the hours of employment if such limitatiori is reasonably calculated to promote any of the accepted objects of police
power, public health, morals, etc. If that be true, why is it
not equally competent to limit the hours of employment with
the idea of creating more jobs? Will it be said that such objective is not within the accepted purview of the police
power? Who will argue that the unemployment of millions
of our people is not a matter of the most serious concern to
the entire nation? Never in its history was the police power
invoked to check a greater menace, greater danger than that
created by the inability of millions of men and women willing and anxious to find a job. There is no more distressing
spectacle in the universe than a child pulling at its father's
coat, begging for bread, the father being unable to furnish
that bread because he can't get a job.

184

DICTA

So, if it is constitutional to limit the hours of employment, it would seem to follow that it was equally so to establish a minimum wage. We are aware that Justice Sutherland,
in the minimum wage case, drew a distinction between the
hours of employment and the wages of employment. He insisted that wages were the heart of the contract. We feel the
reasoning of Chief Justice Taft in that case is more persuasive. He said (p. 403):
"I assume that the conclusion in this case rests on the
distinction between a minimum of wages and a maximum of
hours in the limiting of liberty to contract. I regret to be at
variance with the court as to the substance of this distinction.
In absolute freedom of contract the one term is as important
as the other, for both enter equally into the consideration
given and received, a restriction as to one is not any greater
in essence than the other, and is of the same kind. One is the
multiplier and the other the multiplicand."
But what is the alternative if this law is unconstitutional? Shall we return to the economic philosophy of Malthus? It was his idea that the pressure of population upon
the means of subsistence, as he termed it, would solve itself
through natural processes. When wages were low there was
no work, and hence no bread. The wage earner would be
starved out. At least, he would not reproduce. But when
work was plentiful and wages were good, the worker would
again perpetuate the species. In this way the law of supply
and demand would eventually produce the proper adjustment. There may have been some justification for such a
doctrine when Malthus, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill
propounded their economic philosophy, because nature was
niggardly and the means of subsistence was limited. But
now the contrary is true. Nature has been lavish; Providence
has been beneficent, and there is an over-abundance of material things. There is an under-consumption, and not overproduction. That under-consumption is due directly to unemployment. To restore the consuming capacity of vast
masses of the people-the immediate objective of the N. I.
R. A.-who will say that that is not a consummation devoutly to be desired? A law so intimately interwoven with
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the welfare of the people-indeed, a law so indispensable not
only to the welfare but to the very safety of the peoplecannot be unconstitutional. If it is, then the purpose-of the
Constitution, as expressed in its preamble, is merely sham
and pretext.
The offense of Jones in this case was serious. His conduct was anti-social. This law, in substance and effect, says
to industry: "You are your brother's keeper." Jones insists
that he is not. This is the issue. In determining this issue it
must not be forgotten that the duty so enjoined does not rest
upon merely altruistic or idealistic reasons. Indeed, an obligation resting on such reasons alone would be incapable of
enforcement. Mankind has not progressed thus far. But
back of it there are intensely practical and material reasons
that are so far-reaching that they even affect Jones' own selfish interests. The notion that an ever-increasing portion of
the population may continue to enjoy material happiness and
prosperity, and an ever-increasing portion of the population
may continue to barely exist and even suffer from want and
privation, is not sensible. The history of human events prove
its pathetic fallacy. Yet in a last analysis the objection to the
N. I. R. A. is grounded upon that very proposition.
The contention that the appellant's activities were
strictly intrastate commerce is a mere incident to the vital
questions involved. Strictly speaking, and in the ordinary
acceptation of the term, his business would undoubtedly
have been beyond the power of Congress. The declaration of
the policy of the National Industrial Recovery Act states:
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to remove
obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which tend to diminish the amount thereof; and to
provide for the general welfare by promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of cooperative action among
trade groups, to induce and maintain united action of labor
and management under adequate governmental sanctions and
supervision, to eliminate unfair competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible utilization of the present productive
capacity of industries, to avoid undue restriction of production (except as may be temporarily required), to increase the
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consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power, to reduce and relieve unemployment, to improve standards of labor, and otherwise to rehabilitate industry and to conserve natural resources."
Everybody appreciates that interstate, as well as intrastate commerce, has been approaching the vanishing point.
We have shown, we believe, that lack of employment and
low wages are directly responsible for this diminution of
commerce. Hence it follows that Jones' violation of the Act
directly affected interstate commerce and is within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government.
LAW DAYS
HE first of a series of annual conferences for the improvement of law in Colorado will be held at the University of Colorado in Boulder or Saturday, May 19,
1934. The guest of this year's conference will be the Hon.
Earle W. Evans, president of the American Bar Association.
Known as "Law Days," these conferences will be held
yearly at the University and will be devoted to some particular state problem in jurisprudence. The subject of this
year's conference is the Rule-Making Power of the State Supreme Court. The conference has been divided into two
sessions. The morning session will consider the question of
the Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court looking forward to possible improvements in civil and criminal procedure. The subject of the afternoon session will be the RuleMaking Power as it may pertain to Bar Organization and
Discipline.
All lawyers and jurists in the state are urged to attend
this Law Day. Inasmuch as the Law Day is to be an annual
event, a complete registration of all those attending is to be
made and kept as part of the annals.
Law Day is being sponsored by the School of Law of
the University of Colorado in cooperation with the Boulder
County Bar Association. Members of the committee in
charge of the program are: James Grafton Rogers, Dean of
the School of Law; Stevens Park Kenney, Treasurer of the
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